We follow a two-stage procedure to examine for the first time the cost efficiency of Greek cooperative banks. Our sample consists of 16 banks over the period 2000-2004. We first use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the technical, allocative and cost efficiency for each bank in sample. Then, we use Tobit regression to determine the impact of internal and external factors on banks' efficiency. The results of DEA indicate that Greek cooperative banks could improve their cost efficiency by 17.7% on average as well as that the dominant source of cost inefficiency is allocative rather than technical. The results of Tobit regression indicate that size has a positive impact on all measures of efficiency. However, the impact of capitalization, branches and ATMs depends on the efficiency measure and whether we control for market conditions or not. GDP per capita has a negative and significant impact on all measures of efficiency, while unemployment rate has also a negative and significant impact on technical and cost efficiency although not on allocative efficiency. Finally, banks operating in regions with higher disposal income of households in relation to the total disposal income of households in Greece are more efficient in terms of allocative and cost efficiency.
Introduction
Over the last years, several papers have examined the efficiency of banks using either parametric (e.g. stochastic frontier analysis, thick frontier approach, distribution free approach) or non-parametric (e.g. data envelopment analysis-DEA) techniques 1 .
However, most of these studies focus on commercial banks, while considerably less studies examine the efficiency of cooperative banks (e.g. Molyneux and Williams, 2005; Bos and Kool, 2006) or consider them in comparisons with other types of banks (e.g. Girardone et al., 2006) . Some of the studies that examine cooperative banks focus on individual countries such as U.S. (Rezvanian et al., 1996) , Netherlands (Bos and Kool, 2006) , Italy (Altunbas et al., 1994) , Finland (Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1990) , and Germany (Lang and Welzel, 1996) , while others consider various EU countries (e.g. Molyneux and Williams, 2005; Cavallo and Rossi, 2002; Weill, 2004; Girardone et al., 2006) .
The purpose of the present paper is to provide additional evidence by examining the Greek cooperative banking sector. Our study has two overall objectives. The first is the estimation of the cost efficiency of Greek cooperative banks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that undertakes such an analysis in Greece, in contrast to previous studies that focus on commercial banks (e.g. Karafolas and Mantakas, 1996; Noulas, 1997 Noulas, , 2001 Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2001; Christopoulos et al., 2002; Tsionas et al., 2003; Halkos and Salamouris, 2004; Apergis and Rezitis, 2004; Kamberoglou et al., 2004; Rezitis, 2006; Pasiouras, 2006) . Furthermore, the previously mentioned studies, which examine various EU cooperative banking sectors (e.g. Girardone et al., 2006) , have traditionally excluded Greek banks, due to difficulties in collecting data which are not available in commercial databases such as Bankscope.
Our second objective lies on the investigation of the factors that have an impact on the efficiency of Greek cooperative banks. We consider several external and internal factors as explanatory variables. External factors are market-specific and reflect various aspects such as the economic well-being of the residents, unemployment, and investments. Since the banks in the sample operate in 16
prefectures from 11 regions, local market economic conditions might have an impact on their cost efficiency. In a similar manner, the importance of considering environmental variables during the estimation of efficiency has been recognized in early cross-country studies (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002) and examined in most of the recent cross-country studies (e.g. Hauner, 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; Pasiouras, 2007) . However, to the best of our knowledge, only Bos and Kool (2006) have examined the impact of local market conditions on the efficiency of cooperative banks, while focusing on Netherlands. Internal factors correspond to both financial and non-financial bank-specific characteristics.
Our study is particularly important because, despite their relatively small market share in comparison to commercial banks, Greek cooperative banks play an important role in the development of the local economy. They mainly focus on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and private citizens, provide support, and encourage the development of local enterprises. By offering competitive banking products adjusted to local conditions and with operational features, they attempt to be established as reliable, friendly, and flexible. Hence, the level of their efficiency and the analysis of its determinants can be of special interest to several stakeholders such as customers-members, bank managers, local community, and of course bank regulators.
The rest of the paper is structure as follows. Section 2 provides a brief note on the Greek cooperative banking sector. Section 3 describes the data and methodology, while Section 4 discusses the empirical results. The conclusions are presented in Section 5.
A brief note on the Greek cooperative banking sector
The Greek cooperative banking industry has a history of approximately ten years.
While a few institutions were established earlier 2 , they were operating as credit cooperatives until the early 1990s when they obtained a licence to operate as cooperative banks. More precisely, according to the regulations, credit cooperatives that raise the minimum capital required and fulfil certain condition can apply and obtain the permit from the Bank of Greece to operate as credit institutions, allowing them to offer all banking activities like any commercial bank within the borders of the Then, the efficiency scores from step one are regressed on external and internal factors using Tobit regression as in Rezitis (2006) , Havrylchyk (2006) , Isik and Hassan (2003) , Pasiouras (2006 Pasiouras ( , 2007 DEA is a mathematical programming approach for the development of production frontiers and the measurement of efficiency relative to the developed frontiers (Charnes et al., 1978) . One of its well-known advantages, which is particularly relevant to our study, is that DEA works well with small samples. As
Maudos et al. (2002) point out, "Of all the techniques for measuring efficiency, the one that requires the smallest number of observations is the non-parametric and deterministic DEA, as parametric techniques specify a large number of parameters, making it necessary to have available a large number of observations." (p. 511).
Another advantage of DEA is that there is no need to specify a particular functional form for the production frontier.
To discuss DEA in more technical terms, let us assume that there data on K inputs and M outputs on each of N DMUs (i.e. banks). For the i-th bank these are represented by the vectors x i and y i , respectively. The N K × input matrix, X, and the N M × output matrix, Y, represent the data for all N banks. According to Charnes et al. (1978) the input oriented measure of a particular bank, under constant return to scales 4 (CRS), is calculated as:
4 Banker et al. (1984) suggested the use of variable returns to scale (VRS) that decomposes technical efficiency under CRS (TE-CRS) into a product of two components. The first is technical efficiency under VRS also known as pure technical efficiency (PTE) and the second is scale efficiency (SE) that refers to exploiting scale economies. The technical efficiency scores obtained under VRS are higher than or equal to those obtained under CRS and SE can be obtained by dividing TE-CRS with PTE. While several recent studies perform the analysis under VRS, others argue in favour of CRS rather than VRS. For example, Noulas (1997) points out that the assumption of CRS allows the comparison between small and large banks. In a sample where a few large banks are present, the use of VRS framework raises the possibility that these large banks will appear as being efficient for the simple reason that there are no truly efficient banks (Berg et al., 1991) . Avkiran (1999) also mentions that under VRS each unit is compared only against other units of similar size, instead of against all units. Hence, the assumption of VRS is more suitable for large samples. Soteriou and Zenios (1999) argue that caution is necessary when using the VRS formulation. First, because the model orientation (i.e. input minimization or output maximization) becomes important. Second, because the use of weights restriction in the VRS assessment may lead to some other problematic results (Allen, 1997) . On the basis of these arguments, we estimate our model under the assumption of CRS as Avkiran (1999), Noulas (1997 Noulas ( , 2001 ), Ariff and Can (2007) among others. The total cost efficiency (CE) of the i-th bank is calculated as
That is, CE is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost, for the i-th bank.
The (input-mix) allocative efficiency (AE) is calculated as AE = CE/TE. All three measures can take values between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating higher efficiency.
Variables
The first step in measuring efficiency using DEA is to specify the inputs and outputs of banks. As in most recent studies (e.g. Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Isik and Hassan, 2003; Pasiouras, 2007) we adopt the intermediation approach, which assumes that banks act as financial intermediates that collect purchased funds and use labour capital to transform these funds to loans and other assets. The three inputs are: fixed assets (X 1 ), deposits (X 2 ) and number of employees (X 3 ). The two outputs are: loans (Y 1 ), and liquid assets & investments (Y 2 ). The input prices are calculated as:
depreciation expenses to fixed assets (P1), interest expenses to deposits (P2) and personnel expenses to number of employees (P3).
As mentioned earlier, in the second stage of the analysis we examine the impact of bank-specific factors and local market conditions on bank's efficiency. In particular we use two financial 5 and two non-financial bank-specific characteristics.
SIZE measured by the logarithm of total assets is a proxy for size; EQAS calculated as equity capital to total assets is a measure of capital strength; ATMs and BRANCHES correspond to the number of ATMs and branches respectively. They both indicate the easy to access to the services of banks and potentially capture strategic decisions of bank management. For instance, in those regions in which the population density is low, banks might need an extensive network of branch offices to meet customer demand. However, extensive network will result in higher overheads and therefore lower cost efficiency. Hence, a high number of ATMs might be an alternative way to offer part of banks' services at a lower cost.
In an attempt to capture the impact of local market conditions on efficiency,
we use four variables in total. GDPCAP is the GDP per capita; UNEMPL is the unemployment rate; INCOME corresponds to the disposal income of households 6 in 5 Obviously several additional financial variables could be used. However, we avoid including variables that contain elements such as loans and deposits, that have been used as inputs/outputs in the first stage of the analysis to minimize potential heterogeneity concerns. 6 Disposal income of households corresponds to the primary and secondary of households. It is calculated as: operating surplus and mixed income + compensation of employees (received) + property income (received) -property income (paid) + social benefits other than social benefits in kind the region as a percentage of the total disposal income of households in Greece;
INVGDP shows the total gross fixed capital formation (ie. new investments in fixed capital assets) as a percentage of GDP in the same geographical area.
Data
Our UNEMPL, INCOME), we use data for the general region (e.g. Crete) following the classifications of General Secretariat of National Statistical Service of Greece. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation). Panel A shows data used in the first stage of the analysis (i.e. DEA), while Panel B reports data used in the second stage 9 (i.e. Tobit regression).
[Insert Table 3 Around Here]
(received) + other current transfers (received) -current taxes on income wealth (paid) -social contribution (paid) -other current transfers (paid). 7 While our sample appears small in absolute terms, it is comparable to previous studies that examine efficiency in the Greek commercial banking sector as well as in other countries. For example, Apergis and Rezitis (2004) and Rezitis (2006) examine six banks, Karafolas and Mantakas (1996) examine eleven banks, while the sample in Pasiouras (2006) ranges between twelve and eighteen banks. Several studies outside Greece have also used relatively small samples, including the study of Chu and Lim (1998) that examines as few as six banks, Drake (2001) that examines only nine UK banks and Neal (2004) that examines twelve Australian banks. After all, as mentioned in section 3.1 one of the most well known advantages of DEA is that it works well with small samples. 8 The first year for which data were available for Cooperative Bank of Serres is 2004. As for banks with zero values in inputs/outputs these were excluded from the analysis in the respective years, because DEAP 2.1. (Coelli, 1996) cannot deal with zero and negative values. 9 At this point, we should mention that that we have smoothed all independent variables by replacing observations above the 95 th percentile and below the 5 th percentile with the corresponding values. This approach reduces the impact of outliers in the estimation of the parameters of the model while it allows retaining all observatories in sample.
Results
As in Isik and Hassan (2002) among others, we estimate separate annual efficiency frontiers rather than a common frontier across time. Isik and Hassan (2002) point out the following two advantages of this approach. First, it is more flexible and thus more appropriate than estimating a single multiyear frontier for the banks in the sample.
Second, it alleviates, at least to an extent, the problems related to the lack of random error in DEA by allowing an efficient bank in one year to be inefficient in another, under the assumption that the errors owing to luck or data problems are not consistent over time. Table 4 presents the average efficiency scores by year. The overall (cost) efficiency score ranges between 0.802 (2004) and 0.836 (2002) with an average equal to 0.823 over the period of our analysis. Thus, Greek cooperative banks could improve their cost efficiency by 17.7% on average or in other words, banks could have used only 82.3% of the resources actually employed (i.e. inputs) to produce the same level of outputs. In each year, allocative inefficiency is always higher than technical inefficiency, suggesting that the dominant source of cost inefficiency of Greek cooperative banks is allocative rather than technical. On average, banks in sample could improve technical efficiency by 7.9% and allocative efficiency by 10.9%. This implies that the managers of banks were relatively good at using the minimum level of inputs at a given level of outputs but they were not that good at selecting the optimal mix of inputs given the prices.
[Insert Table 4 Around Here]
In order to investigate the determinants of efficiency we construct an econometric model with TE, AE and CE as dependent variables. As in previous studies, due to the limited nature of our efficiency measures (i.e. range between 0 and 1) we use Tobit analysis. As Saxonhouse (1976) points out, heteroscedacity can emerge when estimated parameters are used as dependent variables in the second stage analysis. Thus, following Hauner (2005) and Pasiouras (2006 Pasiouras ( , 2007 , QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates are calculated. Panel A in Table 5 shows the regression results when we consider only bank-specific attributes as independent variables. Panel B presents the results when both the bank-specific attributes and the variables that proxy for market conditions enter the equation.
[Insert Table 5 Around Here] EQAS is statistically significant and positive related to TE, indicating that well-capitalized cooperative banks are more technically efficient that is consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g. Isik and Hassan, 2003) . However, the insignificant impact of EQAS on AE and CE indicates that the capitalization of banks does not influence their allocative and cost efficiency. LOGAS is statistically significant and positive related to all measures of efficiency. Hauner (2005) offers two potential explanations for which size could have a positive impact on cost efficiency.
First, if it relates positively to market power, large banks should pay less for their inputs. Second, there might be increasing returns to scale through the allocation of fixed costs (e.g. for research or risk management) over a higher volume of services or from efficiency gains from a higher specialized workforce. The results also indicate that banks with a broader ATM network appear to be more efficient (in terms of TE and CE), whereas more branches reduce efficiency (TE and CE) that is consistent with the results of Bos and Cool (2006) in Netherlands. However, the impact of both ATM and BRANCHES on CE disappears when we control for market conditions. GDPCAP has a negative and statistically significant impact on all measures of efficiency, however the value of the coefficient is relatively small in all cases. INVDP is also negatively related to efficiency although insignificant in all cases. To some extend these results might be related to the findings of previous studies which report that in high growth and investment regions cost efficiency is relatively low (Maudos et al., 2002; Bos and Kool, 2006) . Maudos et al. (2002) argue that under expansive demand conditions banks feel less pressure to control their costs and are therefore less cost efficient. However, in our case we also find that as the disposal income of households in the region relative to the total disposal income of households in Greece increases, allocative and cost efficiency also increase. Finally, we find that lower unemployment rate results in higher technical and cost efficiency.
Conclusions
Over the last years, Greek cooperative banks, which have a history of approximately ten years, have demonstrated an improvement in most financial aspects along with an increase in branches, personnel and members. Despite their importance for the local markets and enterprises, they have received significantly less attention than commercial banks. Hence, in the present study, we followed a two-stage procedure and examined for the first time the efficiency of the Greek cooperative banking sector.
Our sample consisted of the population of cooperative banks, a total of 16 banks, operating in Greece over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . We first use data envelopment analysis to estimate the efficient frontiers and determine the efficiency score for each bank in sample. We found that Greek cooperative banks could improve their cost efficiency by 17.7% on average or in other words they could have used only 82.3% of the resources actually employed (i.e. inputs) to produce the same level of outputs. We also found that allocative inefficiency was always higher than technical inefficiency.
Thus, the managers of banks were relatively good at using the minimum level of inputs at a given level of outputs but they were not that good at selecting the optimal mix of inputs given the prices.
In the second stage of our analysis, we used Tobit regression to determine the internal and external factors that had an impact on banks' technical, allocative, and cost efficiency. We found that well-capitalized cooperative banks were more technically efficient although capitalization was not related to allocative and cost efficiency. Larger banks were more technical, allocative and cost efficient ones.
Banks with a broader ATM network and less branches appeared to be more technical and cost efficient, however the impact of both ATMs and branches on cost efficiency disappeared when we controlled for market conditions.
With respect to the local market conditions, GDP per capita had a negative and statistically significant impact on all measures of efficiency; however, the value of the coefficient was relatively small in all cases. Unemployment rate also had a negative and significant impact on technical and cost efficiency. Finally, banks operating in regions with higher disposal income of households in relation to the total disposal income of households in Greece, were more efficient in terms of allocative and cost efficiency.
Future work could extend our research in various directions not considered in this study. First, the efficiency of cooperative banks could be compared with that of commercial banks. Second, subject to data availability over a longer period that would result in a higher sample, one could estimate cost and profit efficiency using stochastic frontier analysis. 
